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ABSTRACT 
The paper studies the solvency of the Indian public sector and the 
eventual monetization and inflation implied by stabilization of the debt-GNP 
ratio without any changes in the primary deficit. 
The nonstationarity of the discounted public debt suggests that 
indefinite continuation of the pattern of behavior reflected in the historical 
discounted debt process is inconsistent with the maintenance of solvency. 
This message is reinforced by the recent behavior of the debt-GNP ratio and 
the ratio of primary surplus plus seigniorage to GNP. 
Our estimates of the base money demand function suggest that even maximal 
use of seigniorage will not be sufficient to restore solvency. 
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DEBT, DEFICITS AND INFLATION: AN APPLICATION TO THE PUBLIC FINANCES OF INDIA 
Willem H. Buiter and Urjit R. Patel 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The state of Indian public finances appears perilous. In recent years 
the public sector financial deficit has been rising in real terms and as a 
proportion of GNP. The same is true for the primary or noninterest deficit. 
The real values of the public debt and the public debt-GNP ratio are rising 
sharply. Even the discounted public debt, that is the present value of the 
public debt (discounted to some common base year), is rising steadily. The 
question naturally arises as to whether this pattern of debt and deficits is 
sustainable. 
There are four reasons why a rising public debt burden may be of concern. 
The first of these is financial crowding out. If there is no debt neutrality, 
the substitution of borrowing for current taxes (even lump-sum) on labor 
income will tend to raise private consumption. In an economy with full 
utilization of resources this will lead either to the displacement of private 
investment and other interest-sensitive forms of private spending or to an 
increase in the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments. 
This aspect of public debt and deficits will not be addressed in what follows. 
The second reason relates to tax smoothing. Even if there is 
"first-order" debt neutrality, the option of running budget deficits or 
surpluses may be valuable if there are no lump-sum, nondistortionary 
tax-transfer schemes available. Temporary deficits and surpluses permit 
changes in the time profile of the distortionary (dead weight) losses (or 
collection costs) associated with nonlump-sum taxes and transfers. Under 
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rather restrictive separability and homogeneity assumptions, a tax smoothing 
prescription emerges (see e.g. Barro (1979]): the ratio of distortionary tax 
receipts to the tax base is expected to be constant over time. If there is no 
first-order debt neutrality, financial crowding out concerns may prevent 
otherwise desirable tax smoothing. For reasons of space this issue too is not 
considered further in what follows. 
The third concern, which is addressed in this paper, relates to the 
eventual monetization of persistent deficits and thus to their potential 
inflationary consequences. The last concern is the possibility of insolvency 
or bankruptcy of the national Exchequer. This too will be dealt with in what 
follows. 
The question of how to evaluate the sustainability of a government's 
fiscal financial strategy has been explored intensively in recent years (see 
e.g. Ruiter (1983a, b; 1985; 1989a, b], Anand and van Vijnbergen (1989], 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986], Grilli (1989] and Vilcox (1989]). 
After presenting a brief review of some of the key facts concerning 
recent budgetary developments in Section 2, we turn in Section 3 to a 
systematic analysis of whether the current and recent behavior of key 
budgetary and related time series is sustainable. Since our conclusion is 
that a continuation of current patterns would eventually lead to insolvency of 
the Exchequer, we turn in Section 4 to the consideration of alternative policy 
options to avoid insolvency. These fall into three categories: first 
policies aimed at ensuring larger primary surpluses or smaller primary 
deficits; second policies to reduce the interest cost of borrowing; and third 
increased recourse to seigniorage or the inflation tax. Our main conclusions 
are summarized in Section 5. 
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2. SOME FACTS CONCERNING DEBT, DEFICITS A.ND SEIGNIOBAGE 
Our data cover the period 1970/71 to 1986/87. The most striking fact is 
the dramatic increase in the total (internal and external) public debt-GNP 
ratio since 1980/81, from 32.8 percent in that year to 52.4 percent in 
1986/87--an average annual increase in the ratio of 3.3 percentage points. 
There is no reason to believe that there has been a significant downturn in 
the ratio since then, or even that the rate of increase has been reduced 
markedly. Figure 1 and Table 1 show this striking pattern quite clearly. 
Our total public debt figure (NTD) covers both internal (or domestic) and 
external (or foreign) debt, and subtracts official foreign exchange reserves. 
The domestic subtotal includes domestic private sector holdings of central 
government debt (CDD), state government debt (SDD) and public enterprise debt 
(PDD). Intrapublic sector assets a.nrl liabilities are netted out. It is 
important that the liabilities of public enterprises (and of the "holding 
companies" created in the mid seventies) be included in the public debt total, 
since ultimately these liabilities are de facto or de jure the responsibility 
of the state or central Treasuries. The banking sector, other'than the 
Reserve Bank, was excluded from our definition of the public sector despite 
its being publicly owned. The decomposition of the domestic public debt is 
given in Table 2. Note that it is the domestic debt that accounts for most of 
the increase in total government indebtedness. 
The foreign debt (TFD) figures in Table 3 include public and publicly 
guaranteed long-term debt (as defined and given in the Vorld Bank's Vorld Debt 
Tables), use of IMF credit, and an estimate of public and publicly guaranteed 
short-term debt. Foreign exchange reserves Bare subtracted from TFD to get 
net foreign debt (NTFD). 
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TABLE 1: 7. GNP 
NTD NTDD NTl'D 
1970/71 37.9 23.9 14.0 
1971/72 39.3 24.7 14.6 
1972/73 40.7 25.7 15.0 
1973/74 34.8 21.4 13.4 
1974/75 34.0 20.8 13.2 
1975/76 34.6 21.1 13.5 
1976/77 35.8 23.4 12.4 
1977/78 33.3 23.5 9.8 
1978/79 32.9 24.7 8.2 
1979/80 33.6 25.7 7.9 
1980/81 32.8 24.7 8.1 
1981/82 36.1 25.5 10.6 
1982/83 41.2 28.9 12.3 
1983/84 41.4 29.3 12.1 
1984/85 44.8 31.3 13.7 
1985/86 48.6 33.6 15.0 
1986/87 52.4 35.9 16.5 
SOURCES: 
1. Report of the Committee to Review the Working of the Monetary System,
April 1985, RBI, Bombay. 
2. India, Bureau of Public Enterprises, Public Enterprises Survey: Annual 
Report on the Working of Industrial and Commercial Undertakings of the 
Central Government, Volumes for 1970/1 to 1986/7. 
3. Report on Currency and Finance, RBI, Volumes for 1977/8-1987/8.
4. Economic Survey, Government of India, 1988/9.
5. World Debt Tables: External Debt of Develonin~ Countries. 1988/9.
Volumes II and III, Country Tables, Washington: DC. , ' ' 
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES: 
NTD =NTDD + NTFD (see notes to Tables 2 and 3). 
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TABLE 2: DOIESTIC PRIVATE HOLDINGS OF CENTRAL GOVERNIENT, STATE AND 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE LIABilITIES, 1970/1-1986/7 (i. OF GNP) 
CDD SDD PEDD NTDD 
1970/71 18.5 5.1 0.3 23.9 
1971/72 19.1 5.3 0.3 24.7 
1972/73 19.9 5.4 0.4 25.7 
1973/74 16.4 4.8 0.2 21.4 
1974/75 15.5 4.7 0.6 20.8 
1975/76 15.1 5.2 0.8 21.1 
1976/77 16.8 5.4 1.2 23.4 
1977/78 17.2 5.2 1.1 23.5 
1978/79 17.9 5.4 1.4 24.7 
1979/80 18.4 5.5 1.8 25.7 
1980/81 17.7 5.2 1.8 24.7 
1981/82 18.6 5.1 1.8 25.5 
1982/83 21.3 5.4 2.2 28.9 
1983/84 21.4 5.5 2.4 29.3 
1984/85 22.6 5.9 2.6 31.1 
1985/86 24.7 6.1 2.8 33.6 
1986/87 26.5 6.3 3.1 35.9 
SOURCES: 
1. Report of the Committee to Review the Working of the Monetary System,
April 1985, RBI, Bombay. 
2. India, Bureau of Public Enterprises, Public Enterprises Survey Annual 
Report on the Working of Industrial and Commercial Undertakings of the 
Ce_ntral Government, Volumes for 1970/1-1986/7. 
Ri:>nnr+ m1 f!11rri:>nf'v ~nn li'in~nf'i:> RRT Vnh1mt:>c -fnr 1077/SL10R7/R3. """"_J:'_.._..., _.._._ _...,.._..__.._..__J _...... _ __ , .&1,,._,.._, 1'V.L"6-"11.IVU ..LV.L .LVII/V .LVVI/V•.&..&..L&.t.N,,L&. 
4. Economic Survey, Government of India, 1988/9. 
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES: 
NTDD =CDD + SDD + PEDD. 
CDD: Internal debt of Central Government except special securities issued to 
the Reserve Bank of India, Treasury bills issued to the Reserve Bank of 
India and to State Governments; plus Small Savings Scheme; plus 
Five-Year Time Deposits; plus Provident Funds etc; minus loans and 
debentures to Public Enterprises. 
SDD: Internal debt of State Governments less Ways and Means Advances from 
the Reserve Bank of India; plus Provident Funds; less loans to Public 
Enterprises. 
PEDD: Rupee denominated debt of Public Enterprises not held by Central 
Government or States. 
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TABLE 3: FOREIGN LIABilITIES AND ASSETS OF THE 
PUBLIC S~CTOR, 1970/1-1986/7 (7. OF GNP) 
TFD R NTFD 
1970/71 15.4 1.4 14.0 
1971/72 16.2 1.6 14.6 
1972/73 16.5 1.5 15.0 
1973/74 14.8 1.4 13.4 
1974/75 14.4 1.2 13.2 
1975/76 15.9 2.4 13.5 
1976/77 16.4 4.0 12.4 
1977/78 15.2 5.4 9.8 
1978/79 14.2 6.0 8.2 
1979/80 13.5 5.6 7.9 
1980/81 12.4 4.3 8.1 
1981/82 13.2 2.6 10.6 
1982/83 15.2 2.9 12.3 
1983/84 15.2 3.1 12.1 
1984/85 17.1 3.4 13.7 
1985/86 18.2 3.2 15.0 
1986/87 19.5 3.0 16.5 
SOURCES: 
1. Vorld Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing Countries, 1988/9, 
Volumes II and III, Country Tables, Vashington, DC. 
2. Economic Survey, Government of India, 1988/9. 
DEFINITIONS OF ViRIA.BLES: 
NTFD =TFD - R. 
TFD: Public and Publicly Guaranteed Long-Term debt plus use of IMF Credit 
* plus imputed Short-Term Public Debt . 
R: Official foreign exchange reserves plus SDRs. 
* Ve assumed that the Public Sector's share of total short-term external debt 
was the same as its share of total long-term debt. 
Note: External debt data in Vorld Debt Tables is on a calendar year basis. 
The figures in Tables 1 and 3 "apportion" the calendar year figures to 
financial years (April 1 to March 31) e.g. the figure for financial year 
1986/7 is three-quarters of the calendar year 1986 figure plus one-quarter of 
the calendar year 1987 figure. 
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Table 4 shows that the public sector deficit as a proportion of GNP has 
been rising since 1973/4 with the exception of two dips in 1977/8 and 1981/2. 
The primary (noninterest) deficit as a proportion of GNP shows a similar 
pattern, more than doubling between 1973/4 and 1986/7 to 9.8 percent. 
Interest payments reached 4.1 percent of GNP in 1986/7. Use of seigniorage 
has been nonnegligible, averaging 2.4 percent of GNP over the last five years 
of our sample. Table 5 gives the time series for GNP growth, inflation, 
exchange rate depreciation and interest rates. Figures for the discounted 
debt, discounted primary deficit and discounted seigniorage--which are key 
ingredients in our solvency tests--are given in Table 6 and Figure 2. 
3. IS THERE! THREAT TO THE SOLVENCY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR? 
A key question when evaluating the fiscal options open to the Indian 
government is whether a continuation of past and present policies is 
consistent with government solvency. To answer this question we start from 
the consolidated public sector budget identity given in equation (3.1). It 
consolidates general government (central, state and local) with the public 
enterprise sector and the central bank. 
(3.1) 
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TABLE 4: THE PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT, ITS COMPONENTS 
AND SEIGNIORAGE, 1970/1-1986/7 (i. OF GNP) 
PRIIARY INTEREST 
DEFICIT DEFICIT PA.DENTS SEIGNIORAGE 
1970/71 5.8 3.9 1.9 1.1 
1971/72 7.3 5.3 2.0 1.1 
1972/73 6.9 5.0 1.9 1.0 
1973/74 5.6 3.9 1.7 2.2 
1974/75 5.9 4.2 1.7 0.7 
1975/76 6.7 4.7 2.0 0.3 
1976/77 7.1 4.8 2.3 1.4 
1977/78 6.9 4.9 2.0 1.9 
1978/79 7.9 5.6 2.3 2.2 
1979/80 8.3 5.7 2.6 2.8 
1980/81 10.0 7.6 2.4 1. 7 
1981/82 9.6 6.9 2.7 1. 7 
1982/83 10. 7 7.8 2.9 2.2 
1983/84 10. 7 7.7 3.0 3.1 
1984/85 12.4 9.1 3.3 1.3 
1985/86 11.6 8.2 3.4 2.7 
1986/87 13.9 9.8 4.1 2.7 
SOURCES: 
1. Economic Survey, Government of India, Volumes 1972/3-1988/9. 
2. Report on Currency and Finance, RBI, Volumes 1980/1-1987/8. 
3. Statistical Appendix: Supplement to the RBI Occasional Papers, Volume 
3(1), June 1982, Monetary Policy in India: Issues and Evidence. 
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TABLE 5: SELECTED ECONOIIC INDICATORS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
i.A in Depree.
Growth GNP i. GDP Deflator i.A in CPI Ex. Rate i. 
1970/71 6.15 2.99 4.19 0.0 
1971/72 2.14 5.43 5.36 0.32 
1972/73 -0.54 11.00 11.44 2.74 
1973/74 3.74 18.89 27.00 1. 72 
1974/75 0.20 17.97 16.77 1.44 
1975/76 9.67 -2.87 -10. 77 8.49 
1976/77 1.61 6.59 8.91 3.29 
1977/78 8.37 3.41 2.90 -4.20 
1978/79 6.71 2.06 3.59 -4.17 
1979/80 -4.51 15.56 12.13 -1.58 
1980/81 6.48 18. 71 12.58 -2.27 
1981/82 6.48 10.01 8.82 13.13 
..« nnn /nn n ,,.. ,.. nn ,.. ,.. .. ... ,..,.. 
l'.JO~/Oo .} .'±/ I • i:o ';J.';Jl ( • l5l5 
1983/84 7.61 8.36 11.15 7.05 
1984/85 3.20 7.14 5.01 15.27 
1985/86 6.11 7.53 8.85 2.90 
1986/87 6.07 5.60 7.61 4.42 
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TABLE 5, continued 
(5) (6) i7) (8)
Yield on Of icial All 
L.T. Gov't Advance Creditors Creditors 
Securities Rate 7. Rate 7. Rate 7. 
(Rupee) (Rupee) (US$) (US$) 
1970/71 5.15 7.75 2.18 2.40 
1971/72 5.64 8.50 1.93 2.03 
1972/73 5.37 8.50 1.48 1.83 
1973/74 5.37 8.75 1.80 1.98 
1974/75 6.16 11.25 2.15 2.28 
1975/76 6.28 14.00 2.68 2.85 
1976/77 6.25 14.00 3.48 3.70 
1977/78 6.25 13.50 2.33 2.80 
1978/79 6.43 13.00 2.05 2.45 
1979/80 6.59 14.75 2.65 4.28 
1980/81 6.97 16.50 2.60 4.78 
1981/82 7.23 16.50 4.35 5.35 
1982/83 7.73 16.50 5.70 7.15 
1983/84 8.24 16.50 5.13 6.70 
1984/85 9.22 16.50 5.83 6.48 
1985/86 9.94 16.50 5.03 5.73 
1986/87 10.19 16.50 5.18 5.55 
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TABLE 5, continued 
SOURCES: 
1. Columns {1) and {2): IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 
1989, Washington, DC. 
2. Column (3): Economic Survey, Government of India, Volumes 
1969/70-1987/8.
3. Column (4): IMF, International Financial Statistics {IFS), Monthly,
1970-1988, Washington, DC. 
4. Column (5): Report on Currency and Finance, RBI, Volumes for 
1970/1-1987/8.
5. Column {6): Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, Monthly, Volumes for 
1970/1-1987/8. 
6. Columns (7) and (8): World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing
Countries, 1988/9, Volumes II and III, Country Tables, Washington, DC. 
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TABLE 6: DISCOUNTED* DEBT, PRIDRY DEFICIT AND SEIGNIORAGE, 1970/1-1986/7 
(current Rupees discounted to 1970/1} 
(CR.RS) 
NTD PRIDRY DEFICIT SEIGNIORAGE 
1970/71 14887 1542 426 
1971/72 15660 2118 451 
1972/73 16966 2083 433 
1973/74 17162 1924 1063 
1974/75 18668 2283 3788 
1975/76 18909 2580 185 
1976/77 19644 2652 793 
1977/78 19542 2893 1114 
1978/79 19698 3314 1338 
1979/80 20672 3532 1701 
1980/81 22529 5231 1160 
1981/82 27065 5167 1257 
~ --- ,__
l'd'6-:1,f '6~ 31955 6022 1695 
1983/84 34834 6500 2594 
1984/85 38820 7923 1115 
1985/86 47045 7980 2655 
1986/87 51427 9618 2636 
* Discounted using the Long-Term Government Bond Yield. 
SOURCES: 
Same as for Tables 1-5. 
GAUSS 



























N is the nominal stock of base money, B the stock of domestic currency 
-* denominated public debt, B the stock of foreign currency denominated public 
* debt, F the stock of foreign exchange reserves, K the public sector capital 
stock valued at current reproduction cost, C government consumption, A public 
sector gross domestic capital formation, T net current revenue, i the domestic 
* nominal interest rate, i the foreign nominal interest rate, Y the foreign 
exchange rate, P the domestic price level and p the cash rate of return on 
public sector capital. 
For simplicity our analysis is cast in terms of one-period public debt, 
and the interest rate on international reserves is assumed to be the same as 
* that paid on foreign debt, but these simplifications are unimportant. Let B 
-* * =B - F be net official foreign debt. 
It is sometimes helpful {but without behavioral significance) to rewrite 
this identity in terms of the behavior over time of stocks and flows per unit 
of GDP. This yields 
* (1 + i.,_1) * (1 + i_, 1)(1 + f._, 1)
(3.2) 
bt- 1 (1 + :rt- 1)( / +~ nt- 1) + bt- 1 (1 + :r ;~ ; ) (1 + n;~ ; ) 
Pt-1 k _ 
+ ct + at- 7 t - 1 + nt- t- 1 "t · 
1 
Lower-case stocks and flows are the corresponding upper-case quantities 
pt - pt- 1 yt - yt- 1 
expressed as a proportion of GDP. :rt- l = p ; nt- l - y , 
t t-1 
Y denotes real output. 
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Ve shall refer to ct+ at- rt - Pt_Jkt-l =ot as the primary public 
sector deficit per unit of GDP. It is the conventionally measured 
consolidated public sector deficit net of any interest payments or interest 
* income. Total public debt as a fraction of GDP will be denoted d = b + b 
ut , the increase in the nominal stock of base money as a fraction of GDP will 
be referred to as seigniorage. Equation (3.2) can be rewritten as (3.3). 
is the proportional depreciation rate of the real exchange rate, r the 
* domestic real interest rate, r the foreign real interest rate and r = r - n . 
Finally, defining the augmented primary deficit 
* 
- bt-1 [ * ]0t = 0t + 1 + n (1 + rt- 1) (1 + 1t- 1) - (1 + rt- 1) we get 
t-1 
Solving (3.4) recursively forward in time and, letting Et denote the 





. 0 . 0 1 +1,= J= 
1 
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Let qi =ITi (1 + ;)- l , q_ 1 = 1 be the discount factor from period zero 
j=O 
to period t+i . Equation (3.5) can be rewritten as 
The terminal condition we impose on (3.5') to obtain the government 
solvency constraint or present value budget constraint is 
(3.6) 
In what follows we shall in fact assume that (3.6) holds with strict 
equality i.e. "supersolvency" is not considered. - 1- qt 1 ddt . is the qt-1 - +" +i 
present discounted value at time t of government debt in period t+i . 
Equation (3.6) states that the expectation, at t , of the present value of 
future public debt goes to zero in the limit. It makes no difference of 
course whether we express (3.6) in terms of the debt-GDP ratio and real 
interest rates net of real growth rates; in terms of real debt and real 
interest rates; in terms of debt measured in home currency and nominal 
interest rates in terms of home currency; or in terms of debt measured in 
terms of foreign currency and nominal interest rates in terms of foreign 
currency. 
l&en (3.6) holds (with equality), equation (3.5') becomes the familiar 






(3.7') 0t = LEt[-tit+J+i + 8t+J+i] 
i=O 
where Dt =qt-ldt , the present value at time zero of public debt at time t , 
At+l+i =qt+i6t+l+i , the present value at time zero of the primary deficit at 
time t+l+i and St+J+i = q .u . , the present value at time zero of ,, - t+i t+l+i 
seigniorage at time t+l+i . 
The condition in (3.6) (holding with equality) can be rewritten as 
(3.6') limEtDt . = 0 . . +i 
i-lCIJ 
The original budget identity in (3.4) can be rewritten as 
(3 .4') D t =D t- 1 + At - St · 
THE IEA.NING OF THE SOLVENCY CONSTRAINT 
In a finite horizon economy with a finite terminal date T, the solvency 




In an infinite horizon economy that is not dynamically inefficient, the 
natural analogue of (3.8) is (3.6) or (3.6'). This ensures that in the 
infinite horizon economy--as in the finite horizon economy--the existing debt 
ultimately is serviced (note not paid off) by current and future primary 
surpluses or by current and future seigniorage. 
If the economy is dynamically inefficient, which will be the case if the 
interest rate is below the growth rate forever (rt< nt for all t), there is 
no convincing case for requiring (3.6) or (3.6') to hold. Ponzi games can be 
viable indefinitely in a dynamically inefficient system: the government can, 
each period, pay the interest on its existing debt by further borrowing. Ve 
assume in what follows that while the interest rate can be below the growth 
rate for extended finite periods of time, the Indian economy is not 
dynamically inefficient, and that there are no social free lunches to be 
earned by increasing the public debt (see also Abel et al. [1989]). 
Note that the terminal condition (3.6) or (3.6') can be rewritten as 
(3.9) < 0 . 
Vith a positive initial stock of debt (dt > 0) equation (3.9) is 
satisfied only if ultimately the debt is expected to grow at a rate less than 
1 1the interest rate d~+j+l < 1 . Since 
1 + rt . t+J·+J 
20 
dt+j+l 1 
- 1 + it is clear that solvency requires,dt · -1---,;---
+J + rt .+J 
eventually, positive values for ut - 6t , the sum of seigniorage and the 
augmented primary surplus. This is only a necessary condition, of course. 
The flows of seigniorage and primary surpluses should satisfy (3.7) or (3.7'). 
To prevent the solvency requirement (3.6) or (3.7) from being satisfied 
trivially we must purge market values and discount rates of the influences of 
actual default and of the market's assessment of the risk of future default. 
The discount rates used to obtain the discounted public debt series used in 
the solvency tests should therefore be net of any risk premiums reflecting the 
market's perception of the possibility of default. Similarly, the value of 
the debt used in the solvency tests should be gross of any discount due to 
default risk. When the market value of the debt is endogenous and potentially 
variable even without any default risk (as will e.g. be the case with 
long-term fixed interest debt), it may not be empirically simple to assess the 
influence of market perceptions of default risk on the pricing of the debt. 
Vb.en the debt has a fixed nominal market value in the absence of default risk 
there is of course no empirical problem. Ve assume in what follows that in 
our sample the market does not give any weight to the possibility of default 
on the Indian public debt. 
Note that solvency is a very weak criterion with which to evaluate the 
sustainability of fiscal and financial policy. A government can be solvent 
even though its real debt and even its debt relative to GDP or GNP grows 
without bound. If the long-run growth rate of the debt-GDP ratio while 
positive is less than the long-run value of r i.e. less than the excess of 
21 
the interest rate over the growth rate in the long run, then eventually 
unbounded debt-GDP ratios can still be consistent with solvency. 
The reason why this remarkable fiscal high wire act may be possible is 
that our approach to solvency thus far has ignored the growing excess burden 
associated with ever higher distortionary taxes and the rising real resource 
cost of extracting an ever rising tax burden from the private sector. 
Steady growth in the debt-GDP ratio and even an eventually unbounded 
debt-GDP ratio may be consistent with continued debt service and solvency 
because the government is (implicitly) assumed to be able to tax away in 
lump-sum fashion (i.e. without distortions or collection and enforcement 
costs) any amount up to the sum of GDP plus the interest it pays on the public 
debt. 2 Since the "tax base" is not GDP alone but GDP plus debt interest, 
there is nothing logically inconsistent a.bout rlebt service outstripping GDP, 
even by indefinitely increasing amounts. 
Vhile this point is logically correct, its practical relevance is likely 
to be slight. If dead weight losses, excess burdens or collection costs are 
an increasing and strictly convex function of the real tax take or of the 
tax-GDP ratio, then only finite debt-GDP ratios are feasible. 
Vhile our weak solvency criterion only implies that discounted debt Dt 
cannot have a positive stochastic or deterministic trend, a stricter and very 
plausible practical solvency criterion in addition states that the 
undiscounted debt-GDP ratio dt cannot have a positive stochastic or 
deterministic trend. 
Under neither solvency criterion is it necessary for the public sector 
ever to run conventionally measured public sector financial surpluses even if 
the initial debt is positive. 
Consider the three budget surplus measures given below. 
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The conventional financial surplus (CFS): 
(3 .10a) CFS =T + pl - C + A - [ i. pB + i ·* py B*] •[ ] 
The operational financial surplus (OFS): 
(3.10b) '] [ [ (1 + i) ] BOFS =T + pl - [C + a - (1 + r) (1 + n) - 1 p 
The primary financial surplus (PFS): 
(3.10c) PFS =T + pl - [C + A] • 
Neither under the weak solvency criterion nor under the practical 
solvency criterion is it necessary for a government with a positive stock of 
public debt and r >never to run conventional financial surpluses. It may 
choose to do so. It may be desirable or even optimal to do so, permanently or 
temporarily, but it is not required for solvency. 
Ignoring seigniorage our practical solvency criterion (but not the weak 
solvency criterion) implies that at some point positive operational financial 
surpluses are required. If seigniorage is allowed for, the practical solvency 
criterion need not imply the eventual necessity of operational (or 
asset-revaluation and real-growth-corrected) financial surpluses. 
With positive debt and r - n , the weak solvency criterion and a fortiori 
the practical solvency criterion require, if seigniorage is ignored, that 
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primary surpluses be achieved at some point. Again, recourse to seigniorage 
could reverse this conclusion. 
TESTING FOR SOLVENCY 
The only testable implication of the weak solvency requirement is 
equation (3.6) or (3.6'): the unconditional expectation of the discounted 
public debt should be zero (or nonpositive). 
Since we do not have a structural model of the economic and political 
processes governing the evolution of the Indian public debt, we are restricted 
to a rather mechanical "data description" which aims to answer the following 
questions: 
1. Is there a stable (reduced form) data generating process (DGP) that 
describes the behavior of the discounted public debt? 
2. Is this DGP (covariance) stationary? 
3. If it is covariance stationary, is its unconditional mean equal to zero? 
If the DGP is not covariance stationary, then its unconditional 
expectation will be (almost surely) nonzero. Establishing nonstationarity 
would therefore imply that the policies pursued during the sample period 
would, if they were adhered to into the indefinite future, either imply 
supersolvency or ultimate insolvency of the government. Ve can dispose easily 
of the supersolvency possibility. The initial debt is certainly positive, and 
the case of characteristic roots less than -1 can be ruled out. Note that a 
finding of a nonstationary DGP does not mean that there will be government 
insolvency; only that in the absence of policy or other changes that render 
the DGP stationary, bankruptcy of the Treasury will result. In Section 4 we 
consider some of the policy options that would eliminate the specter of 
insolvency. Ex post the solvency constraint will be satisfied either through 
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changes in the paths of the augmented primary surplus and of seigniorage or by 
default i.e. write downs in the value of the outstanding debt. Our analysis 
also is silent on the important issue as to when and how the threat of 
insolvency (given unchanged policies) will either compel changes in the 
process governing primary surpluses and seigniorage or result in de facto or 
de jure repudiation of (part of) the debt. 
If the DGP is covariance stationary, its unconditional mean will be zero 
if the univariate representation of the stochastic process governing it is 
strictly indeterministic. If the process has a deterministic component, its 
unconditional mean may of course by nonzero even if the process is stationary. 
'What are the testable implications of the solvency constraint for the sum 
of the augmented primary surplus -ot and seigniorage ut? Let xt =-ot + ut , 
and It =qt- lxt . Since if the solvency constraint is satisfied we have 
CD 
(3.11) 0 t = L/tit+l+i 
i=O 
it follows that stationarity of It , the present discounted value of 
seigniorage plus augmented primary surplus, is necessary but not sufficient 
for solvency. The infinite sum of stationary stochastic processes may be 
nonstationary. If that were the case for {It} , then Dt would be 
nonstationary and solvency would fail. Even if the expectation of the 
infinite sum of future It+i is stationary, it need not equal Dt and again 
solvency would fail. An example of such a process for It is given in Wilcox 
[1989] whose approach is followed closely in this section of our paper. 
Let It= ait-l + nt with lal < 1 , and nt white noise. This implies 
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(I) 
(3.12) EtLit+J+i = 1 ~ a It · 
i=O 
Can it be true that Dt = ~ a It? If this were the case, we would have1 
From (3.4') however we know that 
Therefore the first-order stationary autoregressive process for the discounted 
Rnm of seigniorage and the augmented primary surplus is inconsistent with 
solvency. 
We could estimate the stochastic process governing It , calculate 
(I) 
EtLit+J+i and test whether this equaled Dt . An equivalent but slightly 
i=O 
more direct method is to estimate the stochastic process governing Dt and to 
test whether ~imEtDt+i = 0. Hamilton and Flavin [1986] pioneered these tests 
i-1(1) 
of the discounted debt. Wilcox [1989] and Grilli [1989] extended their 
approach. Our analysis involves a statistical generalization of Wilcox's 
approach using techniques developed by Phillips and Perron [1988]. 
Wilcox assumes that Dt can be represented by the following potentially 
multivariate ABINA process: 
(3.13) 
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p(L) is a pth order polynomial, O(L) is a qth order polynomial, Zt is a random 
vector whose first element is Dt , a0 is a vector of constants, and et is a 
vector white noise process. (I - L)dzt is a covariance-stationary series i.e. 
the series Z is integrated of order d • Ve assume that (I - p(L)) and 
(I - O(L)) have all their roots outside the unit circle. Since p(L) and O(L) 
are thus assumed to satisfy the conditions for stationarity and invertibility, 




(3.15) 11(L) = I11iLi = [u- O(L)r 1 [(1 - p(L)] • 
i=O 
Note that the order of the autoregressive process in (3.14) and (3.15) is 
potentially infinite. This representation is operational only if it can be 
approximated by a finite-order autoregressive process. a0 is the 
unconditional expectation of (I - L)dzt . 
The solvency tests of Vilcox's statistical model in (3.15) consist of two 
parts, of which only the first may be necessary. First test whether Zt is 
stationary. By assumption (I - L)dzt is stationary. So Zt is stationary if 
the order of integration dis less than 2
1 . In a univariate representation of 
(3.14) with Dt as the only random variable, a finding that the process 
governing Dt has a unit root (is integrated of order 1) would imply that the 
Dt process is inconsistent with government solvency. A finding that d < ~ 
i.e. that Zt is stationary can still be consistent with insolvency provided 
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the first element of a is nonzero. If we permit supersolvency0 
(limEtDt . < 0) as well as solvency (~im EtDt+i = 0) then nonstationary . +i 
i-+ro i-+ro 
processes involving negative values only of Dt would be permissible. A 
stationary process for Dt with the first element of a0 negative would also be 
consistent with (super)solvency. Neither of these two supersolvency cases is 
a practical possibility for the Indian economy, and they are indeed rejected 
by the data. If Dt is stationary, the second test therefore is whether the 
first element of a is zero.0 
IS THE INDIAN DISCOUNTED PUBLIC DEBT STATIONARY? 
Our empirical tests of the stationarity of the Indian public debt are 
complicated by two problems. First our annual time series is short indeed: 
17 annual observations from fiscal year 1970/71 to fiscal year 1986/87. 
Limited degrees of freedom means low power for all our tests. Second, there 
are problems about the choice of interest rate to use for discounting the 
debt. If expected holding period rates of return (interest coupon payments 
plus capital gains per Rupee invested) ~ere the sa.~e for all debt instruments 
regardless of maturity, currency denomination or other characteristics, there 
would be no problems as the holding period rate of return on any debt 
instrument could be used. 
This assumption of "uncovered interest parity" for all debt instruments 
fails heroically in tests involving industrial country financial claims. Ve 
should certainly not expect it to be valid for the case of India where 
domestic financial markets are characterized by frequent and prolonged 
nonprice rationing. 
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To make our findings as robust as possible under the circumstances, we 
perform four versions of the stationarity tests--two involving domestic Rupee 
interest rates and two involving dollar interest rates. 
Our first domestic rate is a government borrowing rate (the Government 
Bond Yield) while the second is a quasigovernment lending rate--the Advance 
Rate--which relates to the State Bank of India's prime lending rate which 
regulates all interest rates for the various categories and classes of 
advances granted by the Bank. The tests involving the Advance Rate tilt the 
odds towards rejecting nonstationarity as it exceeds sometimes by a wide 
margin the rate actually paid by the government on its outstanding liabilities 
(see Table 5). 
The two dollar interest rates are the "All Creditors" rate from the Vorld 
Bank Vorld Debt Tables and the "Official Creditors" rate from the same source. 
Vith all four interest rates our conclusion is the same. Discounted 
public debt is nonstationary: the process characterizing discounted public 
debt over our sample has a unit root in each case. The pattern of behavior 
that produces the public debt process is therefore not sustainable. 
In his empirical work Vilcox [1989] implements the univariate3 special 
case of equation (3.14) given in (3.16). 
CD 
(3.16) Dt = aO + a1t + Ll/ t- 1 + et 
i=l 
The error term et is assumed to be i.i.d. Eventual insolvency will occur 
if (at least) one of the following conditions holds: 
1. The roots of 1 - P(L) do not all lie outside the unit circle. 
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2. a1 t O, that is there is a deterministic trend (one expects a positive 
coefficient i.e. no supersolvency). 
3. a0 t O, that is even though the Dt process is stationary, its 
unconditional expectation is nonzero (again one expects a1 > 0 i.e. no· 
supersolvency). 
Following Perron and Phillips [1987] we generalize Wilcox's approach to 
handle a wider class of stochastic processes for the error term (see also 
Phillips [1988], and Phillips and Perron [1988]). Our Dt equation is: 
(3.17) 
The error term ut can belong to a very wide class of stochastic 
ro 
processes. {ut} is a weakly stationary sequence of random variables 
0 
satisfying the following conditions (see Phillips [1988]). 
ro 




a! - 2//J < ro • 
m=l 
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These conditions allow for many weakly dependent time series and include a 
broad class of data generating mechanisms such as finite order 1BX1 models 
under very general conditions. 
The original Dickey-Fuller test for the presence of a unit root was 
developed for autoregressive representations of known order and normal i.i.d. 
errors (Dickey and Fuller [1979]). The augmented Dickey-Fuller test assumed 
an autoregressive representation of known order plus a time trend and normal 
i.i.d. errors (Dickey and Fuller [1981]). Said and Dickey [1984] showed that 
the Dickey-Fuller t-test for a unit root can be applied to ABIXA (p , 1 , q) 
models provided the lag length in the autoregression increases with the sample 
1 
size Tat a rate less than T9 . The Phillips-Perron tests are nonparametric 
4and can be applied to a wider class of processes than the three other tests. 
Our null hypothesis for equation (3.17) is that P = 1 , and = 0 withina1 
a maintained hypothesis that permits a nonzero drift a0 • If we fail to 
reject the null, the discounted public debt is nonstationary which would imply 
insolvency if the process persisted into the indefinite future. If the null 
is rejected but we find a significantly positive value of a
1 , that is a 
positive deterministic trend, in the discounted debt series, eventual 
insolvency still looms. If the null is rejected and we cannot reject = 0a1 
and P < 1 , then finding a positive drift (a 0 > 0) again would imply eventual 
insolvency. 
The following three test statistics given in Table 7 are derived in 
Phillips and Perron [1988] for the null that P = 1 and = 0. Z(P) makesa1 
use of the standardized and centered least squares estimates of P. Z(tp) 
makes use of the t statistic on P, tp (for P= 1), and Z(t 9) is the 
regression "F-test" of Dickey and Fuller [1981] for the more general class of 
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TABLE 7: lJNIT ROOT TEST FOR DISCOUNTED DEBT 
Discounted 
Series Z(fJ) Z(tp) 
1.62 1.20 12.26DJ 
-3.37 -1.10 1.08D2 
DJ * -3. 74 -1.39 2.46 
D2 * -2.17 -1.00 4.31 
Critical (95%) -17 .9 -3.60 7.24 
Values** (99%) -22.5 -4.38 10.61 
**These critical values are for sample size 25. Our sample size is 17. Using 
the critical values appropriate to the larger sample biases the test towards 
rejection of the null. 
DJ is the debt measured in Rupees discounted at the Long-Term Government 
Bond ;~ield. 
is the debt measured in Rupees discounted at the average advance rate.D2 
* DJ is the debt measured in U.S. dollars discounted at the foreign all 
creditors dollar interest rate. 
* is the debt measured in U.S. dollars discounted at the foreign officialD2 
creditors dollar interest rate. 
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error processes in (3.17). These three statistics have the same limiting 
distributions for a very wide class of error processes as the statistics 
developed by Dickey and Fuller for the case of i.i.d. errors. The critical 
values of the three statistics are therefore the same and can be found in 
Fuller [1976], and Dickey and Fuller [1981]. Ve also provide the point 






Vith the exception of the Z(t 9) test on D1 (debt in Rupees discounted at 
the Government's Long Bond Yield), all the evidence points to nonstationarity 
of the discounted debt series. The rejection of the (single) unit root 
hypothesis in the case of the Z(t 9) statistic for the D1 series occurs 
because the discounted debt appears to be more nonstationary than can be 
captured by a single unit root. 
Vhen we perform the Phillips-Perron tests for the first difference of 
D1 , we obtain the results given in Table 9. The null of a unit root in the 
first difference of D1 cannot be rejected. The hypothesis of nonstationarity 
for D1 therefore cannot be challenged. 
A.RE THE INDIAN DEBT-GNP RATIO AND THE PRIIARY DEFICIT-GNP RATIO STATIONARY? 
To complement the findings of nonstationarity of the discounted public 
debt, Table 10 below presents unit root tests for the debt-GNP ratio NTD/GNP 
and for the discounted value of the sum of the augmented primary surplus and 
seigniorage X. The point estimates of a0 , a1 and pare given in Table 11. 
The debt-GNP ratio is nonstationary. For the discounted sum of 
seigniorage and augmented primary surplus, we also fail to reject the null 
that p = 1 and = 0.a1 
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TABLE 8: POINT ESTlliTES OF ao, a1 AND p FOR THE DISCOUNTED DEBT* 
pao a1 
-133.9 200.3 1.10D1 
(73.4) (184.6) (0.083) 
1462.8 52.6 0.92D2 
(3651. 5) (43.0) (0.073) 
* 9691.9 667.4 0.78D1 
(7124.2) (414.7) (0.158) 
* 6952.0 566.8 0.87D2 
(8435.1) (376.3) (0.131) 
*Standard errors are given in brackets helow r.oeffir.ient estimates. 
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TABLE 9: UNIT ROOT TESTS FOR AD1 
Z(P) 
-11.69 -3.28 4.03 
Critical (95%) -17.9 -3.60 7.24 
Values * (99%) -22.5 -4.38 10.61 
* These critical values are for sample size 25, (see Table 7). 
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TABLE 10: lJNIT ROOT TESTS FOR NTD/GNP AND I 
Z(P) Z(tp) Z(t3) 
NTD/GNP 0.04 0.02 5.08 
X* -12 .89 -3.16 4.39 
Critical (95%) -17 .9 -3.60 7.24 
Values** (99%) -22.5 -4.38 10.61 
* The discount rate used is the yield on long-term government securities. 
**These critical values are for sample size 25 (see Table 7). 
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TABLE 11: POINT ESTillTES OF , AND p FOR NTD/GNP AND I* a0 a1 
p 
NTD/GNP 0.014 0.0034 0.9883 
(0.039) (0.0015) (0.552) 
X -2681.56 -298 .68 0.18 
(9246.76) (101.84) (0.26) 
* Standard errors are given in brackets below coefficient estimates. 
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4. POLICY OPTIONS TO A.VOID INSOLVENCY 
From equation (3.5) reproduced below, the options for restoring solvency 
are clear: 
(D i 
(4.1) IltIT-1-...--- [-8t +1 . + (Jt+J+~·]~ + nt+i 
i=
. 0 J=. 0 
1 + rt+} 
where 
(4.2) 
The present value of the "solvency gap" (as a proportion of GDP) is given 
by nt • For solvency we require nt ~ 0 or, ruling out the case of 
supersolvency, nt = 0. Vith or without solvency, nt follows a martingale 
(4.3) 
To get some sense of the magnitude of the solvency gap, it is helpful to 
-
calculate the permanent flow equivalent to the stock nt • Let rt be the long 
interest rate net of the real growth rate i.e. 
(4.4) 
rt is the yield on a consol or perpetuity which pays a constant coupon of one 
unit of output each period when the single-period discount rates are r t+J· , 
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and the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates holds. 
6 is the smallestIT [1 1 .] [- t+J+i +"t+J+il]
J=O + r t+J 
constant fraction of GDP that--if it were to be devoted this period and every 
period in the future to eliminating the solvency gap--would succeed in closing 
the gap. It is the "permanent correction" i.e. sustained change in the 
augmented primary surplus or seigniorage (as a proportion of GDP) that must be 









(4.6) ot. = r.~i -:.,---- k . ., 
1 + nt- J i- 1 
we see that there are four broad types of policy options for reducing the 
augmented primary deficit: 1) reductions in government consumption spending; 
2) increases in net current revenues; 3) reducing public sector capital 
formation and/or increasing government cash revenues from the stock of public 
sector capital; and 4) shifting the composition of the public debt between 
internal and external debt. It is important to note that the different 
spending and revenue items that make up 8 cannot be expected to be 
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behaviorally independent of each other either in the short run or in the long 
run. 
The first two options for reducing the primary deficit are conceptually 
simple and politically difficult. Proposals for widening the current revenue 
base through an expenditure tax, a broadly based value-added tax or a broadly 
based income tax have been made for decades with little to show for it. 
Wealth taxes such as a land tax or a tax on urban real estate are also 
administratively feasible but unpopular among the politically influential 
classes. Replacing nonauctioned import quotas with auctioned quotas or 
tariffs is another relatively straightforward policy measure for raising 
current revenues. 
The net cash return on the government's capital stock pk need bear no 
relation whatsoever to the social returns to public sector capital. Cash 
returns are relevant for our purposes because no matter how desirable the 
project it will have to be financed, and the financial implications of the 
project will influence the overall financial position of the government 
including its solvency. 
For many forms of public sector capital, the cash returns are 
persistently negative. Public enterprises with secular operating losses would 
be one example. Social overhead capital or infrastructure that does not yield 
revenues directly (say through tolls and other user charges) but absorbs 
current resources for maintenance is another. To the extent that 
infrastructure boosts real GNP and thus widens the tax base and tax revenues 
for given tax schedules, its contribution to the Exchequer would be through 7 
rather than through pk. In principle such indirect revenue contributions can 
(and should) be allowed for (see Buiter [1989c]), but the necessary 
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information (including estimates of the effect of increments to public sector 
capital on the tax base) is not in practice available. 5 
Noting that Kt - lt-J = At - wlt-J where O < w < 1 is the depreciation 
rate of public sector capital, we can rewrite the budget identity as follows: 
The solvency constraint can in turn be rewritten as: 
CD 
()4 •8 
=~E qt+i[[ ] ]
dt - kt /,- t qt- J 7 t+J+i - ct+1+i + "t+1+i 
i=O 
CD * 
bt .~ E qt+i [ ( * ) ( )] +1,+ /- t qt-1 1 + rt+i - 1 + rt+i 1 + 1t+i 1 + nt .
+1,
i=O 
+ f E qt+i ( ) kt+i 
/,- t qt- J Pt+i - w - r t+i 1 + nt . 
i=O +i 
The debt total emphasized in (4.7) and (4.8) is public debt net of the 
value of the public sector capital stock at current reproduction costs. The 
first term on the r.h.s. of equation (4.8) is the present value of future 
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seigniorage and the primary current account or consumption account surplus of 
the public sector. 
If all public sector assets and liabilities earned the same expected cash 
rate of return as that used in the present value calculations (i.e. rt+i)' 
then the last two terms on the r.h.s. of (4.8) vanish. If Pt+i - w, the net 
of depreciation cash rate of return on public sector capital, exceeds rt+i , 
the marginal cost of domestic borrowing, then smaller primary current 
surpluses and/or less seigniorage are required to achieve solvency. A value 
of rt+i in excess of Pt+i - w worsens the solvency of the government. 
The second term on the r.h.s. of equation (4.8) allows for differences 
between internal and external borrowing rates~ Clearly if the expected real 
rate of return on domestic debt exceeds that on foreign debt (1 + rt+j > (1 + 
* * rt+j)(l + 1t+j) or equivalently if 1 + it+j > (1 + it+j)(l + Et+j)), then 
switching from domestic debt to foreign debt (either through an open-market 
operation today or by switching the future internal-external financing mix 
towards external borrowing) will strengthen the solvency of the government. 
Of course such an operation may not be feasible say because the foreign 
interest rate does not represent the marginal cost of increased external 
borrowing. This will e.g. be the case if there is external credit rationing. 
The final option open to the government to restore its solvency without 
repudiation is to increase the present value of future seigniorage. 
Seigniorage ut can be written in a number of equivalent ways: 
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(4.9) 
Herem denotes base money per unit of GDP. 
The first of the three expressions on the r.h.s. of (4.9) emphasizes the 
real resources appropriated by the government in period t by running the 
printing presses. The second breaks down total seigniorage revenue as the 
product of a "seigniorage tax rate" ~ =µ and a "seigniorage tax base" 
m =J the reciprocal of the income velocity of circulation of base money. 
The third expresses the value of the resources extracted by the government as 
the sum of the increase in the stock of money per unit of output Amt and the 
change in the money output ratio that would have occurred with a constant 
nominal money stock because of inflation and real output growth (approximately 
(;rt- l + nt- 1)mt- 1). Some authors reserve the term "inflation tax" for 
;rt-lmt-l , but we shall use the terms seigniorage and inflation tax 
interchangeably. 
In steady state we assume that 
(4.10) 1 + µ = (1 + n)(l + ;r) . 
We wish to investigate the relationship between u, the amount of 
seigniorage the government wishes to extract, and the rate of inflation. This 
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requires a model of the demand for base money. Base money is the sum of 
currency CU and commercial bank reserves BES i.e. N =CU+ BES. 
For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to work with an aggregate 
demand for base money function which is not "built up" from its constituent 
components CU and BES. Using annual data from 1960/61 to 1986/87, we 
estimated a base money demand equation in velocity form. Y is the ratio of 
GNP to the monetary base (the income velocity of circulation of base money). 
1t-1 mt-1 6In our notation Y = ,,.,,.- - ~---~----- The result is given in 
t - rt I t - (1 + n t- 1)( 1 + 1: t- 1) • 
equation (4.11). 
(4.11) liYt = ,18.282 - 0.151 yt-1 + 2.98,lrt-1 
(9.151) (-2.082) (2.,122) 
- 6. 8 5 0 l nYt- 1 + 0 .18 8 t 
(-9.075) (2.5,15) 
2n = 0.65 SE= 0.92; F(4,20) = 9.15 (0.0002) ; DK= 2.21 . Conventionally 
calculated t statistics are given in brackets below the coefficient estimates. 
SE is the equation standard error. The probability value for the F test whose 
null is that the population B2 is zero is 0.0002. The LN test for 
autocorrelated residuals (from lags 1 to 3) gives Chi2(9) = 1.07. The F-form 
suggested by Harvey [1981] gives F(9, 17) = 0.25. There is therefore no 
evidence of residual autocorrelation. White's [1980] test for 
heteroskedasticity gives F(B, 11) = 0.89. The Chi2 test for normality of the 
residuals yields Chi2(2) = 0.94. 7 
44 
The estimated equation suggests that a higher rate of inflation raises 
velocity (reduces the demand for base money). A possible interpretation of 
the last two terms on the r.h.s. of equation (4.11) is that positive 
deviations of output from trend are associated with reductions in velocity. 
Inferences about the long-run rate of inflation implied by the need for 
seigniorage revenue are most easily made when the money demand or velocity 
equation has a steady state. Equation (4.11) almost qualifies. In steady 
state output grows at the constant proportional rate n. Over the sample 
period the mean growth rate of real output is 0.034. The last two terms on 
the r.h.s. of equation (4.11) can in steady state be written as: 
-6.850lnY - 6.850nt + 0.188t.0 
While the two opposing trends don't quite cancel each other out when n = 
0.034 , a reasonable first approximation would permit us to evaluate long-run 
velocity by ignoring the offsetting time trends. This yields the long-run 
velocity equation: 
(4.12a) Y = 6.463 + 15. 7821: . 
Alternatively we can evaluate both lnY and tat their sample means. This 
yields 
(4.12b) Y = 6.912 + 15. 7821: . 
In what follows we work with the numerical estimates given in equation 
(4.12b). 
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Steady-state seigniorage as a proportion of GNP is, from equation (4.9), 
given by 
(4.13) <r = [ ( 1 + r) (1 + n) - 1] Y- l • 
Unlike the long-run money demand functions that have (l + nj(l + r) or 
ln[(l + nj(l + r)] linear in r, the long-run base money demand function we 
have estimated does not have a long-run seigniorage Laffer curve. Across 
steady states seigniorage increases with the rate of inflation as long as 
9. 17n < 6.912. The reason is (speaking somewhat loosely) that the elasticity 
of long-run money demand (l + nj(l + r) with respect to the inflation rate is 
8less than unity in absolute value for all inflation rates. A greater need 
for long-run seigniorage therefore unambiguously implies a higher long-run 
n - 6.912urate of inflation: 'K = 15.782u - (1 + n) · 
To get a sense of the magnitude of the correction in x = -6 + <r, the sum 
of the augmented primary surplus and seigniorage, we calculate what constant 
value of x would stabilize the debt-GNP ratio at some given valued for given 
constant values of the real interest rate net of the growth rate r - n . 
Since x = ( r - n) d , the figures in Table 12 follow immediately. 
The actual value of xt in 1985/6 was -5.5 percent of GNP (see Table 4). 
It reached -7.1 percent of GNP in 1986/7. Even in the optimistic case in 
which dis stabilized at its 1986/87 value of just over 50 percent of GNP and 
the interest rate exceeds the growth rate by only one percentage point, xt 
would have to be raised by between 6.0 and 7.6 percentage points of GNP 
permanently. 
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If the debt-GNP ratio is not stabilized until it reaches some higher 
level or if the long-run growth rate of GNP falls short of the long-run real 
interest rate by more than one percentage point, the required permanent fiscal 
or seigniorage correction can be considerably higher. 
u, the maximal steady-state seigniorage that can be extracted given our 
· f h d d f · · · b A 1 + n 1 + _ n • 11wi"thestimate o t e money eman unction, is ~iven y u =-r = 15 782 
a four percent long-run real growth rate, u ~ 0.066 that is 6.6 percent of 
GNP. This amount of seigniorage will only be extracted in the limit as the 
rate of inflation goes to infinity. Vithout a reduction in the augmented 
primary deficit, stabilizing the debt-GNP ratio at 50 percent through 
increased use of seigniorage alone will not be possible even when the excess 
of the interest rate over the growth rate is only one percentage point. In 
that case seigniorage won1rl have to be raised by between 6.0 and 7.6 percent 
of GNP to 8.70 or 10.30 percent of GNP. The nonexistence of equilibrium in 
this case suggests the possibility of a hyperinflation. 
The steady-state inflation rate implied by a continuation of the current 
share of seigniorage in GNP (2.7 percent, and therefore a reduction in the 
primary deficit of between 6.0 and 7.6 percent of GNP) would, with a four 
percent long-run real growth rate of GNP, be 21.2 percent per year. Lowering 
the long-run share of seigniorage in GNP to one percent would, with a four 
percent long-run real growth rate, reduce the long-run inflation rate to 2.6 
percent per annum. Raising the state-state share of seigniorage in GNP to 
four percent would, with a four percent real growth rate, imply a long-run 
rate of inflation of 52.0 percent per year. These figures should of course be 
taken with a fairly substantial pinch of salt. Our demand function for base 
money leaves much to be desired. Ve offer it as an illustration of a 
methodology that we believe to be useful. Further empirical refinement is 
47 
TABLE 12: DEBT-GNP R.!'.UO ST!BilIZING VALOES OF SEIGNIOR.!GE 
PLUS !UGIENTED PRfilRY SURPLUS 
d 507. 757. 1007. 
r - n 
1% 0.5% 0.75% 1.0% 
2 1.0 1.5 2.0 
3 1.5 2.25 3.0 
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necessary before confident statements can be made about the trade-offs faced 
by India's policy makers. 
The seigniorage concept analyzed here can be referred to as one component 
of the anticipated inflation tax. Anticipated inflation may also have effects 
on the primary deficit. A tax system that incorporates nominal progression 
will, with any positive rate of inflation, yield increased real tax revenues 
if the tax brackets are not fully index-linked. This "fiscal drag" has been 
argued to be dominated at high rates of inflation by the negative effect on 
real tax collections of delayed payment of taxes and inadequate interest 
penalties for late payment. This Tanzi effect (Tanzi [1978]) is further 
complicated through the existence of nominal specific taxes and tariffs, 
nominal cash limits on spending etc. 
If the government has long-dated fixed interest debt outstanding which is 
denominated in domestic currency, then an unanticipated increase in the rate 
of inflation will act as an unantidpated capital levy on such assets. This 
can be viewed as a de facto repudiation of part of the public debt. Even with 
domestic currency denominated short maturity debt or long-dated but variable 
interest debt, an unexpected capital levy can be imposed if an unexpected 
increase in the general price level can be engineered. In a very open economy 
this can be achieved through a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate, but 
in the case of India the very limited openness of the economy prevents this 
from being a practical policy option. 
Like formal repudiation, de facto repudiation through a deliberately 
engineered unexpected reduction in the market value of the public debt is a 
serious policy option that should be considered along with policy measures for 
reducing the primary deficit and along with the increased use of seigniorage. 
Long-dated public debt, even when index-linked (which is not the case in 
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India), and to a lesser extent short-dated debt is already "contingent debt", 
even in the absence of repudiation risk: its real value can change, both in 
anticipated and unanticipated ways, because of a whole range of shocks that 
have not been engineered deliberately or accidentally by the policy makers. 
One of the likely consequences of (partial) repudiation, (as of a capital 
levy on bond holders or a decline in the market value of long-dated debt due 
to an unexpected increase in the rate of inflation) is to add a risk premium 
to the interest rate the government must pay on new debt issues. In extreme 
cases the government might, for a while, not be able to issue any new debt at 
all. These costs have to be balanced against the cost of reducing the primary 
deficit and of making increased use of seigniorage. There is no general case, 
in equity or efficiency, for exempting the owners of public debt from sharing 
the burden of adjustment to unforeseen contingencies in preference to owners 
of human capital, physical capital or land and in preference to the 
beneficiaries of public spending. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The statistical solvency tests and the estimated demand for base money 
function suggest two conclusions. First continuation of recent patterns of 
behavior will eventually threaten the solvency of the government. Second the 
option of using the inflation tax to close part of the budgetary gap appears 
to be a limited option indeed. Small increases in the share of seigniorage in 
GNP will have a high cost in terms of additional long-run inflation and even 




The first of these conclusions does not stand or fall with our formal 
tests for solvency. Visual inspection of Figures 1 and 2, and Tables 1 and 4 
make it abundantly clear that the fiscal situation is perilous. It is 
primarily the rapid increase in the internal public debt that signals the 
crisis to come. 
Unless measures to reduce the primary deficit are taken, a fiscal crisis 
is bound to come. Vb.ere and when it will strike cannot be predicted with 
certainty. Often a fiscal crisis first manifests itself in the foreign 
exchanges. Actual or imminent international reserve exhaustion is a common 
trigger for emergency measures including recourse to IMF standby financing and 
the conditionality this implies. Such foreign exchange crises can happen even 
if, as in the case of India, the external debt burden of the country is quite 
modest. 
The fiscal retrenchment that appears to be required is large and will be 
painful. The political and economic challenge is to implement the required 
combination of spending cuts, and of tax and other revenue increases in a way 
that does least damage to the economy's growth prospects, and that protects 




1This condition can of course be stated in several equivalent ways such 
* 
Bt+j+l + 5t+j+1Bt+j+1as -
Rt . ++J 
* 
(Bt+j+l \ 5t+4+1Bt+j+l )Pt+j 
(Bt+j + 5t+jBt+j)Pt+j+1 
2In an open economy this statement implies the assumption of a "source 
based" system of taxation which taxes all income streams originating within 
the national economy. Vith a residence-based view of taxation we instead tax 
all income accruing to domestic residents i.e. GNP and the simple story we 
tell here would not work. 
3Strictly speaking, treating time as a purely deterministic process, our 
model is a bivariate version of equation (3.14) with a zero variance 
innovation in the second equation. 
4The tests were performed using a program written by Mico Loretan 1n 
GAUSS. 
5If money losing public enterprises can be privatized at a price 
exceeding the present discounted value of the cash flow of these enterprises 
(on the assumption that they remain in the public sector), such privatization 
can strengthen the government's balance sheet. 
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6The estimation and tests were done using PC Give. 
7Note that 't-J is the money stock at the end of period t-1 . 
8This would be exactly correct if n = 0. 
53 
REFERENCES 
Andrew B. Abel, Gregory Mankiw, Lawrence H. Summers and Richard J. Zeckhauser 
[1989], "Assessing Dynamic Efficiency: Theory and Evidence," Review of 
Economic Studies 56 January 1-19. 
Ritu Anand and Sweder van Vijnbergen [1989], "Inflation and the Financing of 
Government Expenditure: An Introductory Analysis with an Application to 
Turkey," The lforld Bank Economic Review 3 17- 38. 
Robert J. Barro [1979], "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of 
Political Economy 87(5), Part 1, October, 940-971. 
Villem H. Buiter [1983a], "Measurement of the Public Sector Deficit and Its 
Implications for Policy Evaluation and Design," International lonetary 
Fund Staff Papers 30 June, 306-349. 
[1983b], "The Theory of Optimum Deficits and Debt," in Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston Conference Series No. 27, The Economics of Large 
Government Deficits, October, 4-69. 
[1985], "A Guide to Public Sector Debt and Deficits," Economic Policy 
1 November, 14-61. 
[1989a], "The Arithmetic of Solvency," in V.H. Buiter, Principles of 
Budgetary and Financial Policy, 149-159, London: Harvester Vheatsheaf . 
.,,.,._·.;_; __ 
54 
__ [1989b], "Some Thoughts on the Role of Fiscal Policy in Stabilization 
and Structural Adjustment in Developing Countries," in in V.H. Buiter, 
Principles of Budgetary and Financial Policy, London: Harvester 
Vheatsheaf. 
__ [1989c], "Can Public Spending Cuts be Inflationary?" in V.H. Buiter, 
Principles of Budgetary and Financial Policy, London: Harvester 
Vheatsheaf. 
D.A. Dickey and V.A. Fuller [1979], "Distribution of the Estimators for 
Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root," Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 74 427-31. 
__ [1981], "Likelihood Ratio Statistics for Autoregressive Time Series with 
a Unit Root , " Econometrica 49 1057- 72. 
W.A. Fuller [1976], Introduction to Statistical Time Series, New York: \Tiley. 
Vittorio Grilli [1989], "Seigniorage in Europe," in M. de Cecco and A. 
Giovannini (eds.), A European Central Bank?, Cambridge University Press, 
53- 79. 
James D. Hamilton and Marjorie A. Flavin [1986], "On the Limitations of 
Government Borrowing: A Framework for Empirical Testing," American 
Economic Review 76 September, 808-819. 
55 
Andrew C. Harvey [1981], The Econometric Analysis of Time Series, Oxford: 
Philip Allan. 
Pierre Perron and Peter C.B. Phillips [1987], "Does GNP have a Unit Root? A 
Reevaluation," Economics Letters 23 139-145. 
Peter C.B. Phillips [1988], "Regression Theory for Near-Integrated Time 
Series," Econometrica 56(5), September, 1021-1043. 
__ and Pierre Perron [1988], "Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series 
Regression," Biometrica 75(2), 335-46 
S.E. Said and D.A. Dickey [1984], "Testing for Unit Roots in 
Autoregressive-Moving Average of Unknown Order," Biometrica 71 599-607. 
Vito Tanzi [1978], "Inflation, Real Tax Revenue and the Case of Inflationary 
Finance: Theory with an Application to Argentina," International 
lonetary Fund Staff Papers 25 September. 
H. lfuite [1980], "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Estimator and A 
Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica 48(4), 817-838. 
David V. Vilcox [1989], "The Sustainability of Government Deficits: 
Implications of the Present Value Borrowing Constraint," Journal of 
loney, Credit and Banking 21 August, 291-306. 
